On June 17, 2010, in a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court declared that the National Labor Relations Board lacked the statutory authority to issue orders once its membership fell to two members in January 2008. The Board operated with two members until March 2010, when President Obama made two recess appointments. A summary of the Court’s opinion in New Process Steel, LP v. NLRB is available at SCOTUSblog.
In a press release, the current Board defended its effort under “difficult circumstances” to delegate the Board’s powers to a two-member quorum to prevent a “Board shut-down,” but stated it “will now do [its] best to rectify the situation in accordance with the Supreme Court’s decision.” The Board indicated that the issue had been raised in five other cases pending before the Supreme Court and 69 cases pending before the Courts of Appeal. Expecting these cases to be remanded to the Board, “[t]he now-four member Board will decide the appropriate means for further considering and resolving them.” The sole Republican member’s term expires in August.
The Supreme Court gave no guidance as to how the Board should proceed, but noted that “[i]f Congress wishes to allow the Board to decide cases only with two members, it can easily do so.” While Congress could legislatively overrule the Supreme Court, as it did in passing the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009 to overrule Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007), it is not clear whether there is the time or the votes for such action. Any legislative fix is likely complicated by the controversial recess appointment by President Obama of Board chairman Craig Becker, whose nomination had been returned at the end of the 2009 Senate session after Majority Leader Harry Reid was unable to muster 60 votes to move the nomination forward.
Absent a legislative cure, the Board now faces novel and potentially complicated questions regarding the nearly 600 orders affected by the Supreme Court’s ruling. One possible solution would be for the Board to just re-affirm or re-issue its prior orders without further reconsideration. In general, the orders handed down by the Board involved non-controversial issues where Democrat member Wilma Liebman and Republican member Peter Schaumber were able to agree, and thus the result would not likely change with an additional Democrat vote. But there were instances where Liebman signed on to orders “solely for institutional reasons and to expedite final resolution of [a] case,” even though she disagreed with the underlying Board precedent. See, e.g., Fluor Daniel, Inc., 353 NLRB No. 15 (Sept. 25, 2008). With a Democrat majority, the Board may be interested in revisiting some orders which applied precedent it would no longer apply.
In addition, in situations where an unfair labor practice charge has been resolved through withdrawal or settlement, the Board may lack jurisdiction to issue new orders affirming the prior unlawful orders. For example, the Fluor Daniel case discussed above was subsequently settled during compliance proceedings, and so the issues decided by the Board are now moot. In situations where orders are not re-issued, ALJs will not be bound to follow the original orders, but as a practical matter, they may find such opinions persuasive until told otherwise.
The Board may also need to address quickly decisions that either remanded a case to the ALJ for further proceedings or led to a compliance proceeding before an ALJ. If, for example, the Board found a violation of the Act and the General Counsel initiated a compliance proceeding, the ALJ may suddenly be without jurisdiction to proceed. If the Board reissues an order, the Board will have to work out the mechanics of reinstituting compliance proceedings.
Finally, the Board may face continued litigation over whether its delegation of certain powers to the General Counsel (such as the ability to approve the commencement of litigation seeking section 10(j) injunctions) was lawful. While the Court’s opinion stated that its decision did not address that question, the dissent noted that the Court was not rejecting such a view.